

Labour Market Power in Canada

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Introduction


Motivation and Context

- Economic recessions significantly reduce wages and hours worked, especially for new hires and vulnerable workers
 - (*Blundell et al. 2014; Forsythe et al. 2020; Lessem and Hamermesh 2019*)
- Traditional explanations emphasize demand shocks, but recessions may also increase employer wage-setting power
- Monopsony theory predicts that reduced competition among firms allows wage markdowns below marginal productivity
 - (*Robinson 1933; Azar et al. 2022; Benmelech et al. 2022*)
- This study investigates whether the Great Recession increased labour market concentration, reinforcing monopsony power

Introduction

Goal


- (*Center for Future Work*)



Introduction

Goal

- (*Center for Future Work*)



- Does economic recession shift the balance toward employer power?
- How does recession affect the balance of power between employers and employees, and to what extent does this shift occur?

Data & Measurement

Recession in Data

- Wage shares shifted more than Job shares during the recession, pointing to potential downward pressure on wages in certain sectors.
- This asymmetry suggests changes in wage-setting dynamics, potentially reflecting increased labor market power in certain sectors.

► Share of key variables

Data & Measurement

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Data

- Business Employee Administrative Microdata (BEAM)

Data & Measurement

Measurement

$$\text{HHI}_m^{wn} := \sum_j (s_{jm}^{wn})^2, \quad \text{where} \quad s_{jm}^{wn} = \frac{w_{jm} n_{jm}}{\sum_j \sum_m w_{jm} n_{jm}} \quad (1)$$

where w_{jm} denotes the average wage and n_{jm} the employment of firm j in market m .

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- Wage Bill Herfindhall Index HHI_m^{wn} : Theoretically consistent measure of labour market power (Berger and al)
- Employment-based Herfindahl index HHI_m^n : fails to capture the correlation between wages and employment

Local Labor Market Concentration

Measuring Local Labour Market Concentration

- **Markets:** are defined as combinations of province l and 2-digit NAICS industry k

$$HHI_{k_l} = \sum_j (share_{j_{k_l}}^{wn})^2 \quad (3)$$

The local industry concentration is a within industry measure. “In a given industry within a specific local labour market, how many firms (and how large) account for the total employment and wages of workers in that area”

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
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$$HHI^L = \sum_l share_l \sum_{k_l} share_{k_l} HHI_{k_l} \quad (4)$$

- $Share_l$ capture local composition (intra-province change)
- $Share_{k_l}$ capture local industrial composition (intra-industry change within province)

Local Labour Market Concentration (2001-2019)


Wage Bill Herfindahl HHI^L



- Overall downward trend in labour market concentration over the period.
- Temporarily interrupted by a spike during the Great Recession, with an increase of approximately 14% between 2007 and 2009.)

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Local Labour Market Concentration

- what extent does this shift occur?
- We estimate the following decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Delta HHI^L &= \underbrace{\sum_l s_{lt-1} \Delta HHI_{lt}}_{\text{Within-Province Effect}} + \underbrace{\sum_l HHI_{lt} \Delta s_{lt}}_{\text{Between-Province Effect}} + \underbrace{\sum_l \Delta s_{lt} \Delta HHI_{lt}}_{\text{Covariance Effect}} \\
 &\hspace{20em} (5) \\
 &= \underbrace{\sum_l s_{lt-1} \left[\sum_{k_l} s_{k_l t-1} \Delta HHI_{k_l t} \right]}_{\text{local Within Industry Effect}} + \underbrace{\sum_l s_{lt-1} \left[\sum_{k_l} HHI_{k_l t} \Delta s_{k_l t} \right]}_{\text{Local Between-Industry Effect}} \\
 &\quad + \underbrace{\sum_l s_{lt-1} \left[\sum_{k_l} \Delta s_{k_l t} \Delta HHI_{k_l t} \right]}_{\text{Local Covariance-Industry Effect}} + \text{remaining terms}
 \end{aligned}$$

Decomposition – Local Labor Market Concentration

Quantifying Change in local LMC

Table -3: Drivers of Labour Market Concentration During the Great Recession (2007–2009)

Component	Dir.	Magnitude	Key Insight
Within-industry	↑	0.0404	Rising dominance of large firms within industries
Industry composition	↑	0.0870	Reallocation toward more concentrated sectors
Covariance effect	→	0.0007	Minimal correlation between industry growth and concentration
Within Province	↑	0.1280	Rise in concentration primarily within provinces

Note: Growth driven by sectoral reallocation and within-industry consolidation

Local Labor Market Concentration

Quantifying Change in local LMC

■ **Between-Industry Effect (67.9%)**

- Employment and wage bill shifted away from Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, Mining, and Finance sectors (all with negative net entry rates)
- Public Administration and Utilities absorbed much of the reallocated wage bill, with Public Administration alone accounting for 82% of the Between-Industry effect

■ **Within-Industry Effect (31.5%)**

- Dominant firms in Public Administration, Information, and Transportation sectors expanded market share relative to smaller competitors
- Increased concentration primarily occurred through growth of existing large employers, despite new firm entry in some sectors

Economic and Policy Implications

Interpreting Concentration Dynamics

■ Recessions can amplify employer market power

- Consolidation within sectors and reallocation toward already concentrated industries reduce competition and suppress wage growth

■ Public sector acts as a stabilizer during downturns

- Absorption of displaced labour by Public Administration and Utilities helped mitigate employment losses, but raises concerns of long-run concentration

■ Higher concentration reduces worker mobility

- Fewer outside options for workers increase monopsony power and limit wage recovery in local labour markets

■ Countercyclical entry support is crucial

- Policies that promote firm entry and market diversity can prevent the entrenchment of employer power during and after recessions

Conclusion

- The Great Recession triggered a sharp but temporary rise in local labour market concentration, reversing the pre-existing downward trend.
- This spike was driven by both reallocation toward already concentrated sectors and internal consolidation within industries, especially among incumbent firms.
- Understanding these dual mechanisms is essential to designing countercyclical policies that prevent long-term entrenchment of employer power.

Thank You!





Figure 1: Share of admitted Category from 1980 to 2021



Source: BEAM data

Figure 2: Share of admitted Category from 1980 to 2021




Figure 3: Share of admitted Category from 1980 to 2021

Decomposition – Local Labor Market Concentration

Quantifying Change in local LMC

Table -5: Drivers of Labour Market Concentration Trends (2001–2019)

Component	Dir.	Magnitude	Key Insight
Within-industry	↓	-0.15	Increasing competition among firms in the same industry
Industry composition	↑	+0.07	Shift toward more concentrated industries
Covariance effect	→	-0.01	Growing industries experienced falling concentration
Within Province	↓	-0.09	Net reduction in market concentration despite offsetting forces

Note: Long-term trend shows decreasing concentration driven primarily by within-industry competition

Long-Term Concentration Trends (2001-2019)

Drivers of Concentration Decline

- **Industries with negative contribution (reducing concentration)**
 - Utilities (-0.0159, 17%) and Information (-0.0216, 23%) experienced significant deconcentration, with positive net entry rates (10.89% and 16.64%) indicating intensified competition
 - Manufacturing contributed negatively despite negative net entry rate (-16.80%), suggesting more balanced redistribution among surviving firms
- **Industries with positive contribution (increasing concentration)**
 - Finance and Insurance contributed most strongly (+0.008, 8.71%), primarily through between-industry effect, with incumbents capturing most gains despite positive net entry (15.70%)
 - Public Administration: strongly negative within-industry effect (-0.1174) from decentralization, but partly offset by positive between-industry effect (+0.0933), resulting in largest net contribution (-0.0496, 54%)